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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes a randomized experiment to shed light on the role of information and social
interactions in employees' decisions to enroll in a Tax Deferred Account (TDA) retirement plan within
a large university. The experiment encouraged a random sample of employees in a subset of departments
to attend a benefits information fair organized by the university, by promising a monetary reward for
attendance. The experiment more than tripled the attendance rate of these treated individuals (relative to
controls), and doubled that of untreated individuals within departments where some individuals were
treated. TDA enrollment 5 and 11 months after the fair was significantly higher in departments where
some individuals were treated than in departments where nobody was treated. However, the effect on
TDA enrollment is almost as large for individuals in treated departments who did not receive the
encouragement as for those who did. We provide three interpretations, differential treatment effects,
social network effects, and motivational reward effects, to account for these results.
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Low levels of savings in the United States have generated substantial interest in the ques-
tion of what determines savings decisions. A vast literature has studied the impact of Tax
Deferred Accounts (hereafter, TDA), such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and
401(k)s, on retirement savings decisions,1 and, concurrently, the impact of these plans'
features on enrollment and contribution rates. In addition to the tax savings and eco-
nomic incentives (such as employer's match), a number of recent studies emphasize the
role of non-economic factors, such as social interactions, nancial education, inertia, and
commitment. Du
o and Saez (2000) study how individual participation in a TDA plan
within a large university is aected by average participation in one's department. They
obtain suggestive evidence that peer eects have a strong in
uence on the decision to
enroll in TDA plans. Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi et al. (2001a, 2001b) show that
default rules have an enormous impact on employees' participation, contribution, and
asset allocation. When employees are enrolled by default in a TDA, very few opt out and
most employees do not change the default contribution rate or the default allocation of
assets. Thaler and Bernatzi (2001) show that inducing employees to commit to contribute
a large fraction of their pay raises to the TDA (the \Save More Tomorrow" program) has
a dramatic positive impact on savings rates. Bernheim and Garett (1996) and Bayer,
Bernheim, and Scholz (1996), Bernheim, Garett and Maki (1997), among others, study
the role of nancial education. They present evidence that nancial education tends to
be remedial2 but that it increases participation in savings plans, suggesting that employ-
ees may not be able to gather the necessary information on their own. This evidence,
though suggestive, does not provide fully convincing proof that information and nancial
education can have a strong impact on TDA participation decisions, because employers'
1See Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996) for a controversial debate
summarizing the literature.
2Employers resort to it when they fail discrimination testing because the contribution rates of the not
highly compensated employees are too low.
1decision to provide this information is endogenous. Recently, Madrian and Shea (2002)
studied the eects of benets seminars within a large rm and showed interesting evi-
dence of self-selection in the decision to attend benets: employees who attend seminars
are much more likely to be recent enrollees in the TDA plan. They found modest positive
eect of information seminars on TDA participation after a few months.
Financial education is generally recognized as an potentially important avenue to im-
prove the quality of nancial decision making. 71% of the fortune 500 companies system-
atically hold nancial information sessions. A further 10% conducts them occasionally.3
The U.S. Treasury (Summers, 2000) outlined a proposal to improve nancial literacy and
increase the access to nancial services of lower income American households. In particu-
lar, the report stressed the importance of information on savings instruments and the role
of social interaction eects in the decision to save. The goal of this paper is to analyze
the evidence from a random experiment to shed light on both the role of information and
social interactions on the employees' decision to enroll in the employer sponsored TDA
plan of a large university. Our analysis improves upon the studies discussed above because
the source of identication comes directly from the randomized experiment. This allows
us to overcome some of the very dicult identication problems in the presence of peer
eects, described notably in Manski (1993, 1995).4
Each year, the university organizes and invites all its employees to a benets fair
in order to provide information on benets. In particular, a stated goal of the fair is
to increase the enrollment rate in TDA, which the university administration feels is too
3This data come from a telephone survey of all 500 companies we conducted in the summer 2001.
4In spite of these diculties, there is a growing empirical literature on peer eects using observa-
tional analysis which essentially focuses on social behavior, and the adoption of new technologies. For
example, Case and Katz (1991) and Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992) on teenagers' behavior, Bertrand,
Mullainathan and Luttner (1998) on welfare participation, Munshi (2000a) on contraception, and Besley
and Case (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Munshi (2000b) on technology adoption in develop-
ing countries. Sorensen (2001) analyzes peer eects within departments of a university in the choice of
Employer sponsored Health Plans using a methodology related to Du
o and Saez (2000).
2low (around 35%). Obviously, comparing the TDA enrollment decisions of fair attendees
to those who did not attend the fair would not provide convincing evidence of a causal
eect of fair attendance on TDA enrollment, because the decision to attend the fair is
endogenous.5 To circumvent this selection problem, we have implemented the following
experiment. We selected a random sample of employees not yet enrolled in the TDA and
sent them an invitation letter promising a $20 reward for attending the fair. This type
of experiment is a classical encouragement design, often used in medical science, where
treatments are oered to a random group of patients who then decide whether or not to
take the treatment.6 Encouragement designs are rare in economics. An example is the
study by Powers and Swinton (1984) who analyze the eect of hours of study on test
scores by randomly mailing test preparation materials to students to encourage them to
study.
The second objective of our study is to analyze peer eects within departments. We
therefore designed our experiment such that we are able to estimate social interaction
eects. Namely, \treated" individuals who were sent the invitation letter were selected
only from a random subset of departments (the \treated" departments). A number of
recent studies have also used experimental or quasi-experimental situations to study social
interaction eects. Kremer and Miguel (2001) is perhaps the most closely related to our
study. They analyze an experiment design to evaluate own and external eects of a
medical treatment against intestinal worms for children in schools in Kenya, and obtain
evidence of spillover eects. They show that children in treated schools who did not
get the medicine were positively aected. However, in their case, variation in treatment
5For example, individuals who had already decided to enroll, but are not sure exactly how much they
wanted to contribute, may be more likely to attend the fair (see Madrian and Shea (2002) for evidence
of selection in the decision to attend information sessions.
6For example, Permutt and Hebel (1989) study the eect of maternal smoking on birth weight using
randomly assigned free smoker's counseling to encourage mothers to quit smoking. Imbens et al. (2000)
analyze of the eect of 
u shots (recommended but not required) to a random subset of patients on 
u
outcomes.
3status within a school was not randomized but occurred because some children were
not present on treatment day. Katz et al. (2001) use random assignment to a housing
voucher program for households living in high poverty public housing projects in the
Boston area and nd improvement of treated families in safety, health, and exposure to
crime.7 Sacerdote (2001) uses random assignment of rst-year students in Dartmouth
college dorms and nds peer eects strongly in
uence levels of academic eort as well
as decisions to join social groups. These latter two studies on social interactions dier
from ours mainly because they study the eect of assigning individuals to dierent peer
groups, whereas in our study, peer groups (departments) are xed, and we analyze how
individual decisions are aected by an exogenous change on the information set of some
members of the peer group.
The rst stage of our study analyzes the eect of the invitation letter on fair atten-
dance. Treated individuals are three times as likely to attend the fair as control individu-
als. Interestingly, control individuals in treated departments are twice as likely to attend
the fair as control individuals in non-treated departments, despite the fact that only orig-
inal letter recipient could claim the $20 reward. This shows that the invitation letters not
only increased the fair attendance rate for individuals who received them but had also
a spill-over social eect on their colleagues within departments. The direct eect of the
letter on attendance (purged from the peer eects) can also be estimated by comparing
the attendance rates of treated and control individuals within treated departments only.
The second stage of the study tries to estimate the causal eect of fair attendance
and social eects on the decision to enroll in the TDA. We show that, 5 and 11 months
after the fair, individuals in treated departments are signicantly more likely to have
started contributing to the TDA than control individuals. This shows that our experi-
ment, and hence the fair, was successful in increasing TDA enrollment. However, there
is no signicant dierence in TDA enrollment between those who actually received our
7Following our previous discussion, the voucher program can be seen as an encouragement design to
leave public housing projects.
4encouragement letter and those in the same departments who did not. We propose three
dierent interpretations, not necessarily mutually exclusive, to account for these facts.
First, this might be evidence of dierential treatment eects of fair attendance on TDA
enrollment. Employees who come to the fair only because of the nancial reward are
dierent from those who decide to come to the fair because of their colleagues, and it
is plausible to think that the treatment eect is larger for the latter group than for the
former. Second, there might be social network eects within departments. Fair attendees
might be able to spread information obtained from the fair in their departments. Third,
our results might also be explained by motivational reward eects. Paying individuals to
attend the fair might aect their subjective motivation and therefore the perceived value
or quality of the information they obtain at the fair. Such eects have been documented
in the social psychology literature. Our experiment does not allow us to separately iden-
tify these three eects but it allows us to conclude that the important decision about how
much to save for retirement can be aected by small shocks such as a very small nancial
reward and/or the in
uence of peers, and thus does not seem to be the consequence of an
elaborate decision process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the benets
fair and the design of our experiment. Section 3 discusses the reduced form evidence.
Section 4 develops a simple model to guide the subsequent analysis of our results. Section
5 provides additional evidence from a follow-up questionnaire and a general interpretation
of our results. Finally, Section 6 oers a brief conclusion.
52 Context and Experiment Design
2.1 Benets and Benets Fair
The university we study has approximately 12,500 employees. About a quarter of the
employees are faculty members. Our study was limited to non-faculty employees only.8
The university provides retirement benets to its employees through a traditional pension
plan and a complementary Tax Deferred Account (TDA) plan. Part of the traditional
pension plan is a Dened Contribution (DC) plan whereby 3.5% of an employee's salary is
put into an individual mutual fund account.9 Employees can also voluntary contribute to
a TDA 403(b) plan.10 Every employee can contribute to the 403(b) plan any percentage
of their salary up to the IRS limit ($10,500 per year for each individual in 2001). The
university does not match contributions. In both the DC and the TDA plans, employees
can choose to invest their contributions in any number of four dierent vendors.
Each year, the university organizes a benets fair where all employees are invited to
come and learn about all benets (such as health benets, retirement benets, etc...)
provided by the university. The fair is held on two consecutive days in early November
in two dierent locations, each one close to the two separate main university campuses.
About one week before the fair, every employee receives a letter through university mail
inviting her to attend the fair. This letter also provides a brief description of the event. At
the same time, under separate cover, every employee receives a packet describing in detail
university benets along with enrollment forms. November is \open enrollment" month
during which each employee may change her benets choices by submitting the enrollment
form. If the employee does not send back the form, her benets choices are automatically
carried over from the previous year. However, employees are free to enroll in the TDA or
8Du
o and Saez (2000) present suggestive evidence that sta employees TDA choices are not in
uenced
by faculty choices and vice-versa.
9Non-faculty employees have an additional Dened Benets plan in addition to the DC plan.
10403(b) plans are very similar to the better known 401(k) plans but their use is restricted to not-for-
prots rms.
6change their contribution level or investment decision at any time throughout the year.
In both locations, the fair is held in a large hotel reception room. There are a large
number of stands representing the university Benets Oce, and the various health and
retirement benets service providers. The university Benets Oce oers information on
all benets through direct conversation with benets oce sta present at the fair, and
through a number of information pamphlets freely available at their stand. The benets
oce also provides information on how the other stands at the fair are organized. These
other stands are run by each of the specialized service providers. For example, each of the
mutual fund vendors has a stand at which they provide information about the TDA plan
and the specic services they oer within that plan. The fair also oers individuals the
chance to use a specially designed computer program to analyze their specic situation.
Employees are free to come anytime during the three and a half hours during which the
fair is held, and visit any number of stands they want.
2.2 Experiment Design
The university organizes the annual fair in order to disseminate information about benets
and help its employees make better decisions. The university feels the participation rate
among sta (34%) is too low compared to other universities, and that this may be due to
lack of information.
A simple comparison between the benets choices of those who attend the fair and
those who do not does not provide an unbiased estimate of the eect of the fair. Clearly,
those who plan to change their benets choices may be more likely to attend the fair.
Therefore, in order to to identify the causal eect of fair attendance on TDA enrollment,
we set up an \encouragement design", by promising a random subset of employees a
small amount of money for attending the fair. In previous work (Du
o and Saez, 2000),
we have shown that the decisions to participate into the TDA are very correlated among
individuals within departments, which suggests the existence of social eects in enrollment
decisions. Therefore, in order to shed light on social eects within departments, not all
7individuals within the treated departments received a letter. We can thus measure peer
eects using individuals who didn't receive a letter, but who had peers that did.
We used a cross-section of administrative data provided by the university on all its
employees as of August 2000. We restricted the sample to sta employees (i.e. non-
faculty employees) aged less than 65 and eligible to participate in the TDA.11 Of the 9,700
employees meeting these criteria, around 3,500 were enrolled in the TDA as of August
2000. From now on, we refer to these individuals as the pre-enrolled individuals. The
remaining 6,200 individuals were not enrolled in the TDA by August 2000. As very few
employees stop contributing to the TDA once they are enrolled,12 we focus on the decision
to start participating into the TDA. Thus the sample of 6,200 non-enrolled individuals is
our sample of primary interest.
In the rst step, we randomly selected two thirds of the departments of the university
(220 out of a total of 330) as follows. In order to maximize the power of the experiment
(in a context in which we know there are strong department eects), we rst matched
departments according to their size (i.e. number of employees) and participation rate
in the TDA before the fair. We separated department into deciles of participation rates
among the sta. Each decile contains 33 departments. We then ranked them by size
within each decile, and formed groups of three departments by putting three consecutive
departments on these lists in the same triplet. Within each of these triplets, we randomly
selected two departments to be part of the group of treated departments. From now on,
we refer to the treated departments as the T departments and to the control departments
as the 0 departments.
In the second step, within each of the treated departments, any individual not enrolled
as of August 2000 was selected with probability one half. This treatment group is com-
11Part time employees working less than 20 hours per week are not eligible for the TDA. Most of these
employees are students of the university.
12Only 80 of the 3,500 employees enrolled in the TDA stopped contributing during the one year period
we examine. More than ve times as many employees started contributing to the TDA during the same
period.
8posed of 2,039 individuals. We referred to this group as the Treated individuals and denote
them by T1 (T for Treated department and 1 for being selected). The group formed by
the employees in the treated departments who were not selected contains 2,129 individ-
uals and is denoted by T0 (T for Treated department and 0 for not being selected). In
total, there are 4,168 individuals in the treated departments. The control group is formed
by employees in the control departments where no treatments were selected; it contains
2,043 individuals and is denoted by 0.
One week before the fair, we sent a letter via university mail to the 2,039 employees
in the treatment group T1. The letter reminded them of the fair and informed them that
they would receive a check for $20 from us if they were to come to the fair and register
at our desk. This letter is reproduced in facsimile in the appendix.
At the fair, we set up a stand for the employees who received our invitation letter
to register their name. Unfortunately, the benets oce did not authorize us to record
the names of the fair participants who did not receive our letter. However, we recorded
their total number: a student stood at the fair entrance and distributed a coupon to each
person who entered the hall. The coupons had dierent colors according to the status
of the participant (active or retired), which allowed us to count the number of active
employees who attended the fair. Everybody had to pass through the narrow entrance
enter the fair, and the few people who refused the coupon were carefully counted. We are
thus condent that we accurately recorded the number of participants. In order to collect
information on the TDA status and the department aliation of all the fair participants,
we organized a rae. The coupons that were distributed at the entrance of the fair had
two parts, with a number written twice. Each fair attendant who wanted to participate in
the rae gave us half of the coupon. We asked all the rae participants their department
aliation and whether they were currently enrolled in the TDA. The rae was held
every 30 minutes, and the prize was a $50 Macy's gift certicate. A total of 1,617 active
employees attended the fair. 573 of them had received our letter. Out of the remaining
1,044 employees, 766 (i.e., about three quarters) came to play the rae and registered
9their department aliation and TDA enrollment status. An important issue that arises is
whether there was selection by T versus 0 departments in who decided to play the rae
(and hence provide their department aliation and TDA status). We do not believe this
was the case: most of those who refused to play the rae did so because they visited our
stand just after the previous rae had been played, and did not want to stay at the fair
long enough to wait for the next rae. Therefore, we assume that fair attendants who did
not register their department aliation are distributed between T and 0 departments as
those who did register. Therefore, in what follows, we scale up the attendance recorded
in each department by a factor of 1;044=766.13
In order to assess the eects of the experiment and the fair on TDA participation, the
university provided us three waves of data. The rst wave was obtained in September
2000, just before the fair. The second wave was from March 2001 (4.5 months after the
fair) and the third wave from October 2001 (11 months after the fair).
Finally, we sent a short questionnaire (reproduced in the appendix) to 917 employees
in April 2001. The questionnaire was designed to assess the intentions and evaluate the
knowledge of employees about retirement benets. An additional goal of sending out the
questionnaire was to remind those that were not yet enrolled of their TDA status, and
(potentially) provide them a cue to think about enrolling in the TDA. In the questionnaire,
we asked employees whether they were enrolled in the TDA, why they were not enrolled,
whether they saved for retirement through other means, and whether they had attended
the fair. In order to induce employees to send back the questionnaire, we promised a $10
Macy's gift certicate to any employee who would send back the questionnaire within
6 weeks. We selected 917 employees to receive the questionnaire as follows. First, we
restricted the sample to those who were not enrolled in the TDA by March 2001. Second,
one third of employees (301) were selected among the 573 fair participants who did receive
the invitation letter. The second third (311) of employees were selected among the 1,499
13We present in Section 5 evidence supporting our non-selection hypothesis. However, we will discuss
how modifying this assumption would aect our result.
10employees who received the invitation letter but did not come to the fair. The last third
(305) were selected among our control group (those who did not receive the invitation
letter).14 We did not intentionally leave out any departments, but since the number of
questionnaires was not very large, there are a number of departments where we did not
send any questionnaire.15
3 Results: Summary statistics and Reduced form dif-
ferences
In the presence of social interactions, employees who work in departments where some
people received the letter can be aected by the experiment even if they did not receive the
letter themselves. They may be more likely to come to the fair themselves, because they
are reminded by others of the event, or because employees come to the fair in groups.16
They may also be more likely to enroll in the TDA even if they do not come to the fair
themselves, either because they are directly in
uenced by the action of those who went
to the fair, or because these individuals share the information they gathered at the fair.
Thus, employees are potentially subjected to two kinds of treatments: they can receive the
invitation letter themselves (group T1), and they can be in a group where some employees
received the letter (departments T). Those who receive the letter are, obviously, subject
to both treatments.
The summary statistics are displayed in Table 1, broken down into 4 groups. In
columns (1) to (3), we present the statistics for individuals who belong to treated de-
partments T. Column (1) has the statistics for the entire group (group T), column (2)
has the statistics for the group of treated individuals (group T1), and column (3) has the
statistics for the untreated individuals in treated departments (group T0). In column (4),
14Out of these 305 individuals, 160 are from the T0 control group and 145 are from the 0 control group.
15These departments tend to be smaller, but once we control for the dummy indicating in which group
the department belongs, the dierence in size is small.
16This is something we observed at the fair.
11we present the statistics for individuals who belong to the untreated departments (group
0). It is important to note that all these statistics (except the rst row of Panel A and the
second row of Panel B) focus only on individuals not enrolled in the TDA on September
2000 before the fair. In Table 2, we present dierences in the same variables across groups.
The dierences are estimated by a regression, which includes a triplet xed-eect, and
corrects standard errors for clustering at the department level.17 Columns (1), (2), (3),
and (4) present the dierences between group T and group 0, group T1 and group T0,
group T0 and group 0, group T1 and group 0 respectively.
Panel A presents background characteristics. In the rst wave (on September 2000
before the fair), a very small proportion of employees started contributing to the TDA
(the rst wave is from September 2000, but we used data from August 2000 to construct
the randomization), but there is no apparent dierence across groups in these proportions.
Since we are interested in changes caused by the fair, we focus in the remaining of the
analysis on individuals who were still not enrolled in the rst wave (i.e. by September
2000). Since the groups were chosen randomly, the mean of observable characteristics
such as sex, years of service, annual salary, and age, are very similar across groups. As
expected, none of the dierences are signicant.
In panel B, we can see that our inducement strategy had a strong eect on the prob-
ability of attending the fair: in treated departments, as much as 21.4% of individuals
attended the fair. In control departments, fewer than 5% of individuals attended the fair.
The dierence, 16.5%, is highly signicant (Table 2, column (1)). Comparing treated
individuals versus controls in the treated departments in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1
shows that social eects account for a large part of the eect of our experiment on fair
attendance. The fair attendance rate of those who received our letter is 28%, and is 15.1%
for those in the treated departments who did not receive the letter. Thus, the direct eect
17As it is visible from inspecting Table 1, this does not aect the point estimates of the dierences.
However, it reduces the standard errors, by absorbing some unexplained dierences across departments
of similar sizes and pre-fair TDA enrollment rates.
12of receiving the letter (taking out any social eect, which are the same for groups T0 and
T1) displayed on column (2) of Table 2 is 13.8%. The dierence in the attendance rate
between the T0 group and the 0 group (which is solely due to social eects) is almost as
high, at 10.2%, and highly signicant (see column (3) of Table 2).18
In Panel C, we look at TDA participation. After 4.5 months, relatively few people
have enrolled. However, employees in treated departments are already signicantly more
likely to be enrolled than employees in control departments (4.9% versus 4%). This
represents a 24% increase in the enrollment rate. There is no signicant dierence between
groups T1 and T0, however.19 The dierence between groups T0 and 0 is 1.26 percentage
points and signicant. Eleven months after the fair, enrollment is higher still, and the
dierence between treated departments and control departments is 1.4 percentage point
and signicant as well (it represents a 19% increase in TDA enrollment). The dierence
between groups T1 and T0 is now positive, but still very small and insignicant. The
dierence between group T0 and group 0 is positive, and signicant at the 10% level.
Obtaining signicant dierences between these randomly chosen groups means that our
experiment did have an impact on TDA enrollment. This impact is large in relative
terms (an increase of 20% in the likelihood of enrollment after 11 months). However,
because people update their TDA status very infrequently, it is small in absolute terms
(an increase of only 1.5% points of enrollment, on a base of 36%)). This eect is tiny
compared to interventions that change the default rules for TDA enrollment (such as
in Marian and Shea (2001), and Choi et al. (2001a, 2001b)) or that oer individuals
the option to allocate automatically future pay rises to TDA contributions (Thaler and
Bernatzi (2001)).
18This result is of course sensitive to the assumption we made about department aliation of fair
attendants who did not register at our desk. If we make the extreme assumption that all non registered
individuals come from 0 departments, the fair participation rate for T0 group would fall down to 11%
but still be higher than for group 0 (which would go up to 9%). In addition, we show below that the
increase in fair attendance in the T0 group is parallelled by an increased in their TDA participation.
19The point estimate in table 2 is even slightly negative, with a t-statistic of about 1.
13In summary, the results we present in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the incentive scheme
had a large eect on fair participation of treated departments (due to a combination of
the direct encouragement eect and the multiplier eect of social interactions), as well
as a signicant eect on TDA enrollment. This shows that the fair had an eect on the
decision to enroll in the TDA. However, within treated departments, there is no dierence
in TDA enrollment between those who received the letter and those who did not. The
next section presents simple models to interpret these results.
4 Understanding the Eects of the Experiment
4.1 Fair attendance
Let us rst analyze the decision to attend the fair. As we have seen, receiving our
invitation letter with its promise of a $20 reward increases the probability of attending
the fair. Denote this increase in the probability of attending the fair by . As we have
seen, there are peer eects in the decision to attend the fair because T0 individuals are
more likely to attend than 0 individuals. A simple way to capture these two eects is to






where fi is the dummy for attending the fair for individual i, i is a random individual
eect, Li is a dummy indicator for receiving the inducement letter, and Di a dummy
indicator for being in a treated department.20 Column (1) of Table 3 presents the estima-
tion parameters  and  in (1). Actually, these two parameters were already estimated
in the reduced form results presented in Table 2. Taking the dierence of the averages of
20As fi is a 0-1 variable, equation (1) is not strictly correct. The left-hand-side should be replaced
with the probability of attending the fair for individual i, and restrictions imposed on the parameters and
the distribution of i to ensure that this number is always between 0 and 1. These technicalities can be
taken care of easily and thus are ignored to keep the presentation focused on identication questions.
14equation (1) across groups T1 and T0 shows that  =  fT1   fT0 where  fTi denotes average
fair attendance among individuals in group Ti, i = 0;1. Similarly, taking the dierence
of the averages of equation (1) across groups T0 and 0 shows that  =  fT0    f0.
Peer eects in the decision to attend the fair can take two forms. First, if an individual
in a given department decides to go to the fair, she might talk to her colleagues about the
fair, give them information about the details, or ask them to join her, and thus increase the
probability her colleagues attend the fair. Second, it is also conceivable that an employee
receiving the letter might talk about it to her colleagues, even if she does not go herself
to the fair, and thus also aect their attendance rate. For example, colleagues of those
who received the letter may think that if the benets oce is ready to pay some people
$20 to attend the fair, it must be suciently important for them to attend as well. We
model these peer eects by assuming that the average fair attendance rate and the average
\letter rate" (dened as the number of employees who received the letter divided by the
number of employees in the department) in each department in
uence the individual fair
attendance decision.
Let us denote by  f the average attendance rate in the department of individual i, and
by  L the letter rate in the department of individual i. The invitation letter eect and
the peer eects on fair participation can be captured by the simple following linear model
(see e.g. Manski (1993))
f
i = L
i +  L + 1  f + v
i; (2)
where vi is the random individual eect, and 1 < 1, and  are the peer eect coecients.
This equation states that getting the letter increases the own probability of attending the
fair by , and the probability of everybody in the department of attending by =N (N
being the number of employees in the department), and that an exogenous direct increase
in fair attendance of 1 percent translates into a nal increased fair attendance of 1=(1 1)
percent through the multiplier peer eect.
Obviously, our experiment does not allow us to identify all three parameters , ,
15and 1 because we have only two instruments: receiving the letter Li and the dummy
indicator Di for being in a T (versus 0) department. However, the following semi-reduced




R L + v
0i; (3)
Equation (3) can be easily derived from (2) by rst averaging equation (2) by depart-
ment to obtain an expression for  f, and then plugging this expression for  f in (2). Simple
algebra shows that R =   +(+)=(1 1). The parameters  and R of equation (3)
are identied with our experiment21 and can be estimated with an IV regression using Li
and Di as instruments.22 Column (2) of Table 3 presents the estimate of equation (3).
The coecient of the average number of letters is 0.28, and is signicant: an increase
in 10% in the proportion of people who received a letter in the department lead to an
increase of 2.8% in participation of those who did not themselves receive the letter.
It is perhaps reasonable to impose the additional restriction on equation (2) that
 = 0, i.e., a person receiving a letter can in
uence her colleagues fair attendance only
if she decides to go to the fair. In that case, equation (2) is identied and 1 can be
estimated by running the IV regression (2) on the sample of individuals not enrolled in
the TDA by September 2000, using Li and Di as instruments. The results are reported on
column (3) of Table 3. The estimate we obtain for 1 is large and precisely estimated: a
10% increase in attendance increases the probability that an individual attends the fair by
7.5%. Put another way, the multiplier peer eect is 1=(1 1) = 4, that is, an additional
person induced to go to the fair because of the letter will induce, through a trickle-down
eect, on average four additional individuals to attend the fair.
21This specication is similar to that of Acemoglu and Angrist (1999), who seek to estimate human
capital externalities on earnings.
22The average  L is not exogenous because it is computed over all employees (enrolled or not in the
TDA by September 2000).
164.2 TDA Participation
4.2.1 The Model
We showed in Section 3 that individuals in group T1 are more likely to attend the fair
than individuals in group T0 but only equally likely to enroll in the TDA after the fair.
Individuals in groups T1 and T0 are in the same departments and thus exposed to the
same network eects at the department level. The only dierence between the T1 and
T0 groups is that T1 individual received the inducement letter and hence are more likely
to have attended the fair. This suggests that the direct fair eect is zero for those who
attend the fair just because of the $20 reward. Reduced form evidence from Section 3 also
showed that individuals in group T0 are more likely than individuals in group 0 both to
attend the fair and to enroll in the TDA afterward. Three phenomena can explain these
results.
First, as individuals in group T0 are more likely to attend the fair than group 0 indi-
viduals, it is plausible to think that for this group, attending the fair has had a positive
eect on their TDA participation. It is important to note that this positive treatment
eect for group T0 individuals (compared to group 0 individuals) is not necessarily con-
tradictory with the zero treatment eect for group T1 individuals (compared to group T0
individuals) because these treatment eects are not measured for the same population.
The latter eect is the treatment eect of the fair for those individuals who come because
of the inducement letter while the former eect is the treatment eect of the fair for those
individuals who are induced to come to the fair because they have been in
uenced to
attend by their colleagues. It is plausible to think that individuals who attend the fair
just for the $20 might not be very interested in the content of the fair and thus do not
get much out of it. In contrast, individuals induced to come by their colleagues (with no
nancial reward) are likely to be more interested by the event and thus end up being more
in
uenced by what they learn at the fair. We will develop and formalize this dieren-
tial treatment eect below using the theory of Local Average Treatment Eects (LATE)
17developed by Imbens and Angrist (1994), and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996).
The second reason why group T0 individuals are more likely to enroll in the TDA
than group 0 individuals is that, because of our experiment, T departments are dierent
from 0 departments and individuals may be in
uenced by social network eects. Peer
eects within departments could in
uence TDA enrollment through two channels. First,
individuals who attend the fair might share the information obtained on the TDA with
their colleagues and thus increase the enrollment rate in their department.23 Second,
an individual who decides to enroll in the TDA might also discuss her decision with
colleagues, and induce some of them to enroll as well.
Third and more subtle, it is conceivable that, even for an individual who would have
come to the fair with no external inducement, receiving the letter oering the $20 reward
modies her psychological motivation for attending the fair. Because the individual is
now paid to attend the fair, she might convince herself that she is coming just for the $20
and thus that she is not really interested in the content of the fair. This type of eect
is not standard in economic models but there is substantial evidence in the psychology
literature on the motivational consequences of rewards. This literature is summarized
in Ross and Nisbett (1991) (pp. 65-67). Festinger and al. (1959) and Cooper et al.
(1978) showed that providing people with small nancial incentives for acting as if they
hold a given belief promotes greater change in the \rewarded" direction than providing
them with large incentives. Perhaps most closely related to our setting, Lepper et al.
(1973) showed that school children who are rewarded to play with magic markers are less
likely to enjoy it than children who are not, as if \play" had subjectively turned into
\work". These results generated a substantial amount of interest because they go against
the conventional reinforcement theory that would appear more intuitive.
These three eects, namely the dierential treatment eect, the social network eect,
23We assume, however, that only fair attendees who are not enrolled in the TDA, can induce their
colleagues to start enrolling in the TDA. Individuals already enrolled in the TDA presumably in
uence
their colleagues directly through the second channel and not through the information collected at the
fair.
18and the motivational reward eect can be captured the following simple linear model as
follows.24 Let us assume that fair attendance increases the probability of TDA participa-
tion of individual i by 
i. Let us denote by yi the dummy for individual participation in





i +    f + u
i: (4)
The fact that 
i can vary from individual to individual captures the potentially dierential
treatment eect. The social network eect is captured by the average fair participation
rate  f in the department. Finally, the motivational reward eect can be captured by
assuming that the treatment eect 
i is potentially (negatively) correlated with the letter
treatment Li. In order to simplify the presentation, let us assume that 











S is independent of Li (this is the standard treatment eect component), and
 represents the motivational reward eect. Assuming no motivational reward eect
amounts to simply assuming that  = 0 and thus that 
i is independent of Li.
Each individual belongs to one of the groups T1, T0, or 0. In order to dene treatment
eects of fair attendance on TDA enrollment, it is useful to introduce the notion of
potential outcomes for fair attendance. For each individual, we denote by fi(T1), fi(T0),
and fi(0) the fair attendance decision of individual i, had he been in group T1, T0, or
0. Obviously, for each individual i, we observe only one of the three potential outcomes
for fair attendance. As the literature on dierential treatment eects has recognized (see
Imbens and Angrist (1994)), in order to be able to identify parameters of interest, we
need to make the following assumption:
24It would be possible to develop a more general non-linear model but this would not change our
estimation strategy and interpretation. Therefore, we consider only the simple linear framework.
19Assumption 1 Monotonicity Assumption: for each individual i, fi(T1)  fi(T0) 
fi(0).
This assumption states that receiving the letter can only encourage individuals to
attend the fair (and in no case deter them), and that having one's colleagues receive the
letter can also only encourage an individual to attend the fair (relative to the situation
where no colleagues receive the letter). This assumption sounds very plausible in the
situation we analyze. The Monotonicity assumption implies that the population can be
partitioned into four dierent types.
First, the never takers are individuals such that fi(T1) = fi(T0) = fi(0) = 0. These
individuals do not attend the fair and would not attend regardless of the group to which
they belong. Second, we dene the nancial reward compliers type as individuals such
that fi(T1) = 1 > fi(T0) = fi(0) = 0. These individuals attend the fair only if they
receive the letter with the nancial reward promise. Third, we dene the social interaction
compliers as individuals such that fi(T1) = fi(T0) = 1 > fi(0) = 0. These individuals
would not attend the fair if nobody in their department receives the letter, but attend the
fair if they are in a treated department (whether or not they themselves receive the letter).
Finally, we dene the always takers as individuals such that fi(T1) = fi(T0) = fi(0) = 1.
These individuals attend the fair regardless of the group to which they belong.
We make the following additional assumption.
Assumption 2 Exclusion restriction assumption: ui is independent of Li
The assumption that the error term ui is independent of the letter assignment status
Li means that the letter inviting the employee to the fair has no direct eect on TDA
participation decisions of those who do not attend the fair (beyond its eect on individual
and departmental fair attendance).25 The letter we sent did not mention TDA but only
25However note that assumption 1 does not rule out the possibility that the letter can aect the TDA
status of those who attended the fair, by reducing the fair's eectiveness (through the motivational reward
eect described above).
20benets in general, and did not contain any mention of the employee's TDA status (see
the facsimile in appendix).
To assess the extent to which written communication could aect decisions, we send
the questionnaires described in section 2, which asked detailed questions about TDA sta-
tus (see appendix). There is no signicant dierence in TDA participation after 6 months
between departments to which we sent the questionnaire and departments to which we
did not (the dierence is actually negative at -0.093 percentage points with a standard
error of 1.3 percentage points). Within departments to which the questionnaire was sent,
the dierence is only 0.90 percentage points (with a standard error of 0.94 percentage
points) and not statistically signicant either. Therefore, the targeted questionnaire on
TDA did not seem to aect individuals' participation to the TDA. It is thus is plausible
to think that, as stated in Assumption 1, a fair invitation letter does not directly aect
TDA enrollment. This echoes the results in Choi et al (2001a), who sent two versions of
a questionnaire to randomly selected employees, and found that employees who received
a questionnaire with more questions about retirement savings were no more likely to sub-
sequently enroll in the TDA than those who received a version without those questions.26
Taking the average of equation (4) over groups T1 and T0, and taking the dierence,
we obtain












i +    f + u
ijT0]:
Using the exclusion assumption stating that ui is independent of Li, we have







Using the monotonicity assumption, we then obtain





i(T0) = 1]  P(f
i(T1)   f
i(T0) = 1)   P(f
i(T1) = 1)
As P(fi(T1) = 1) =  fT1 and P(fi(T1)   fi(T0) = 1) =  fT1    fT0, we nally obtain
26This is also evidence that information conveyed through mailing may not have a great impact on
nal decisions.
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i(T0) = 1]    
 fT1
 fT1    fT0
: (6)
Thus comparing individuals T1 and individuals T0 provides an estimate of the sum of
the direct average treatment eect for nancial reward compliers and the motivational
reward eect. Note that the social network eects (term    f) cancel out in the comparison
of groups T1 and T0 because they are common to both groups.
Individuals in group T0 and individuals in group 0 do not receive the inducement
letter but some of the peers of individuals in T0 do receive the letter. As we have seen in
Section 3, because of network eects, individuals in T0 are more likely to attend the fair
than individuals in T0. As none of the individuals in groups T0 and 0 receive the letter,
there is no motivational reward eect involved in this comparison. More precisely, taking
the average of equation (4) over groups T0 and 0, and taking the dierence, we have






i(0))] +  [  fT    f0]:
Hence, we nally obtain
 yT0    y0





i(0) = 1] +   
 fT    f0
 fT0    f0
: (7)
Thus comparing group T0 to group 0 provides an estimate of the sum of the direct average
treatment eect for social interaction compliers and the social network eect.
Our analysis has shown that there are four parameters of interest in the model: the
average treatment eect for nancial reward compliers, the average treatment eect for
social interaction compliers, the social network eect parameter  , and the motivational
reward eect . Our experiment provides us with only two instruments Li and Di, thus it
is clear that we cannot identify all four parameters together. Only if we make additional
assumptions about two of these four parameters can we estimate the remaining two pa-
rameters. In the next subsection, we discuss three alternative assumptions under which
the remaining parameters of the model could be estimated. We proceed not with the
22intention of claiming any particular set of assumptions is correct, but rather to explore
the implications of each assumption.
4.2.2 Interpretation under Alternative Identication Assumptions
 No motivational reward and no social network eects
In that situation, both parameters   and  are equal to zero, and we can identify both
average treatment eects for nancial reward compliers and social interaction compliers.
Under these assumption, equation (6) reduces to:
 yT1    yT0





i(T0) = 1]: (8)
Thus, the average treatment eect for nancial reward compliers can be obtained by a
simple IV regression of TDA enrollment on fair attendance on the sample of individuals
in treated departments using Li as an instrument. Similarly, using (7), we have
 yT0    y0





i(0) = 1]: (9)
The average treatment eect for social interaction compliers can be obtained by an IV
regression of TDA enrollment on fair attendance on the sample of individuals in T0 or
0 groups using Di as an instrument. Column (2) and (3) in Table 4 present these IV
estimates, for TDA enrollment 4.5 months and 11 months after the fair. Consistent with
the reduced form evidence, the IV estimates suggest a positive treatment eect on social
interaction compliers, and no eect on nancial reward compliers. The results in column
(3) can be thought of as an upper bound on the eects of the fair itself for the population
of social interaction compliers. These individuals are not aected by the motivational
reward, but if peers eects are present, the IV estimate in (9) would be an upper bound
of the direct eect of the fair. This upper bound is 13.5 percentage points after 4.5
months, and 14.8 percentage points after 11 months. These eects are of comparable size
(slightly higher) than those estimated by Madrian and Shea (2002) in a non-experimental
23set-up.
 Constant Treatment Eects with no motivational reward eect
If there is no motivational reward eect ( = 0) and the standard treatment eect 
i
is the same across individuals and equal to 
, both parameters, 
 and   of the structural
equation (4) are identied and equation (6) reduces to
 yT1    yT0
 fT1    fT0
= 
: (10)
This ratio is the IV estimate presented in column (2) in table 4, which we discuss
above. Therefore, under these restrictive assumptions, we can conclude that the direct
eect of the fair is zero for everyone. Taking the average of equation (4) over departments
0 and T, we obtain
 y0 = (
 +  )  f0 +  u;  yT = (
 +  )  fT +  u: (11)
Therefore the overall eect of fair attendance on TDA participation, taking into account
all the social eects, is the ratio
 yT    y0
 fT    f0
= 
 +  : (12)
This overall eect of one additional person attending the fair on TDA participation is the
sum of the direct causal eect 
 of the fair, and the social eects   from equation (4).
These estimates (for participation after 4.5 months and after 11 months) are presented in
column (1) in table 4. In both cases, the overall eect of the fair is positive and signicant.
Under the assumptions made here, the dierence of columns (1) and (2) gives an estimate
of the social eect parameter. The implied estimates of   are 10.14% and 6.7%, after 4.5
and 11 months respectively.27
27Estimates of the direct and social eects parameters (and their standard errors) can also be directly
obtained by an IV estimation of equation (4) (where 
i = 
), using Di and Li as instruments.
24 Constant Treatment Eects and no social network eects
In this case, the standard treatment eect 
S (for those who did not receive the letter)
can be obtained directly from (7), since   = 0. In turn, equation (6), with the rst term
set to 
S, can be used to recover . Using the estimates of  fT1, and  fT0 from table 2, we
obtain an estimate of  of 0.0927 after 4.5 months, and 0.0620 after 11 months. Under
these assumptions, receiving the letter reduces the treatment eect of the fair by 69% for
TDA participation after 4.5 months, and 42% for TDA participation after 11 months.
The distinction between dierential treatment eects, social network eects, and mo-
tivational reward eects is clear conceptually but our experiment does not allow us to tell
them apart. Thus, it is useful to describe what type of alternative experimental designs
would be needed to separate these eects. Dierential treatment eects arise in our set-
ting because there is a rst stage in our experiment where individuals decide whether or
not to attend the fair. As a result, only a self-selected fraction of individuals attends the
fair. Motivational reward eects arise because individuals receive a monetary payment
for attending the fair.
Social network eects could be identied with the following experiment. Within a
subsample of the \treated" departments, a subsample of employees would all attend au-
tomatically an information session. This could be done by making attendance a job
requirement of employees. One could then test whether the TDA participation rises
among the colleagues of the treated relative to that of individuals in untreated depart-
ments. Motivational reward eects could be estimated by paying people for attending an
information session in a situation where everybody is supposed to attend. For example,
in many rms, new hires are often invited to attend information sessions about benets.
In some departments, this information session could be presented as a normal process
through which all new employees go. In other departments, attending this information
session could be presented as voluntary but a nancial reward could be oered for at-
tendance (large enough to induce virtually everybody to attend). If everybody attends
25in both cases, the average treatment eect would be expected to be the same in both
groups in the absence of a motivational reward eect.28 Evidence of dierential treat-
ment eects could potentially be obtained by using non-monetary incentives of various
intensity to attend the fair. For example, some employees could be sent a letter simply
reminding them of the benets fair. Others could be sent a more pointed letter telling
them that important information can be obtained at the fair. One could also use emails,
personal phone calls or even remind them in person to attend the fair. These dierent
encouragement designs are associated with dierent groups of compliers and may thus
allow estimation of dierent fair treatment eects.
4.3 Direct and Overall eects of the fair: comparisons with
naive estimates
The model developed claries the errors that can be done when ignoring social eects in
experimental data. The data also allow us to compare experimental results with observa-
tional results. Table 6 presents alternative estimates of the eect of the fair.
Columns (1) and (2) are, respectively, the IV and the OLS estimates of the direct
eect on TDA participation of attending the fair after 11 months; they are limited to
employees in T departments.29 The OLS estimate is 0.052 and signicant. As we explained
above, the direct eect of the fair can be estimated by running an IV regression of TDA
participation on fair attendance in treated departments, using the dummy for receiving
the letter as instrument. Given the lack of precision of the IV estimate, the two estimates
are statistically indistinguishable, but the OLS estimate is more than three times as large
as the IV estimate. This is not surprising, given that one would expect those who are
more interested in benets to be more likely to attend the fair.30
28Note that this setting would be close to the experiments carried out in the social psychology literature
reviewed in Ross and Nisbett (1991).
29Since we do not know the identity of those who came to the fair except for those who received the
invitation letter, the OLS estimate is obtained in the sample of those who received the letter.
30For example, as we noted earlier, the fraction of TDA participants is much higher among the sample
26Columns (3) and (4) present alternative IV estimates of the overall eect of the fair on
TDA participation using the full sample (treated and control departments) of employees
not enrolled in the TDA by September 2000. In column (3), we estimate the overall eect
of the fair by an IV regression of TDA participation on average fair participation in each
department, using the dummy for whether the department is treated as an instrument
for average participation. The coecients are 0.057 and 0.082 after 4.5 and 11 months
and are signicant. In column (4), we present the \naive", IV estimate that uses the
letter dummy as an instrument, in the complete sample. This estimate lies between the
estimate of the overall eect and the eect based on the T1 versus T0 comparison. The
naive estimate would underestimate the overall eect of the fair (since part of the \control"
group is actually treated) and overestimate the direct eect on those who received the
letter. Ignoring the analysis we have developed in this paper would lead to a misguided
causal interpretation of the eect of the fair on TDA enrollment.
5 Interpretation and Additional evidence
5.1 Interpretation: Why did the experiment in
uence TDA par-
ticipation?
The striking results of the experiment are the large spillover eects at the fair attendance
stage, and the fact that, despite the large remaining dierence in fair attendance, there is
no dierence in TDA participation between the treated and untreated individuals within
treated departments, while there is a signicant dierence in TDA participation between
treated and untreated departments. As we discussed above, the rst stage results are a
clear indication of social eects in the decision to attend the fair, while the interpretation
of fair attendees who did not receive the letter than among all employees (above 50% versus around 30%).
This shows that TDA participants are more likely to attend the fair, probably because they are more
interested in benets information on average than non TDA participants (see Madrian and Shea (2002)
for evidence of self-selection).
27of the TDA participation results is more delicate: they could be due to social eects,
dierential treatment eects, motivational reward eects, or a combination of the three.
These three dierent explanations have, however, a common feature. They suggests that
an individual's decision to participate in the TDA is aected by small changes in the
environment, and not only by the information content of the fair.
If the results can be entirely explained by social eects, they suggest very strong peer
eects, compared to the direct eect of the fair. This could be true in two models. In
the rst model, the fair conveys useful information, but any information obtained by a
fair participant is completely diused to the entire department he belongs to. This would
explain why group T1 individuals do not participate in the TDA any more than group T0
individuals (
 = 0), who in turn participate more than group 0 individuals (  > 0). This
model has an additional testable implication: the eect of being in a treated department is
entirely due to the increase in the probability that at least one member of the department
attends the fair. Indeed, according to the registration data we collected at the fair, the
probability that at least one department member attends the fair is much larger in treated
departments (93%) than in untreated departments (55%). An implication of the model
is thus that if, as one would expect, the dierence in the probability that at least one
member of the department attends the fair is larger in small departments than in large
departments, the dierence in TDA participation after 4.5 or 11 months between treated
and control departments should also be larger within the smaller departments. Indeed,
the dierence between treated and untreated departments in the probability that at least
one person attends the fair is 59% in the department of 81 employees or less (department
size for the median employee), and 16% in the departments with more than 81 employees.
However, as we show in panel A of table 5, the reduced form dierences after 4.5 and 11
months are virtually identical in the two sets of departments. This rejects the hypothesis
of complete diusion of information.
Under the second model when individuals see more people attending the fair (or re-
ceiving a letter inviting others to attend the fair), they are directly induce to enroll in
28the TDA (irrespective of what those who went to the fair learnt at the fair or decided
to do). Those peer eects thus do not seem to stem from a rational herd behavior in an
environment where information is scarce or dicult to obtain (as in the models of Baner-
jee (1992) or Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992)). At the same time, there is
clearly no strong social pressure to conform to the decisions of the majority regarding the
TDA (as is the case, for example, in the decision of adopt contraception for Bengladeshi
women, as in Munshi (2000b)).
Another explanation for the results is that the treatment eects are dierent for dif-
ferent groups of compliers: it is positive for social interaction compliers, but zero for
the nancial reward compliers. In Table 5, we explore various observable characteristics
which may lead to variations in the eect of the treatment. Column (1) reports average
fair participation in each subgroup, among those who received the letter (we know the
identity of those who attended the fair only for this group). Fair participation was larger
in small departments than in large departments, and for women than for men. In column
(2) and (3), we show the dierence in TDA enrollment between treated and control de-
partments after 4.5 and 11 months, respectively. After 4.5 months, the treatment eect
seems somewhat larger in departments where the participation rate before the experiment
was high (panel B) and average salaries are high (panel D). However, after 11 months,
this dierence shrunk (in panel B) or disappeared (in panel D). This suggests that it
takes more time for those in departments with low initial participation and those with
lower salaries to adjust their TDA participation. Panel C shows that the eects are the
same for men and women. Overall, there is no evidence that treatment eects are widely
dierent across groups dened by observables. Any dierential treatment eect between
nancial reward and social interaction compliers is thus not attributable to observable
characteristics. Of course, it could be due to an unobservable attribute uncorrelated with
these observable characteristic (like interest in the benets). Importantly, even if the
results are entirely due to dierential treatment eects, and social interactions take no
part in explaining the second stage results, they are responsible for the variation in fair
29attendance among the untreated individual in treated departments. Thus, in this case
as well, social network eects caused some people to take steps which ultimately led to
change their TDA participation decision.
If the results are in part explained by the motivational reward eect, this would also
provide evidence that individuals' decisions are in
uenced by small non-economic factors:
when attending the fair on their own, they are in
uenced by it, but are not when they
have been induced to go by the $20 reward. A small perturbation in their motivation to
attend the fair thus in
uences their nal decision. Again, this suggests that individuals'
process of decision making is in
uenced by small changes in the environments.
In summary, a common thread to all these potential explanations is that the par-
ticipation decision is in
uenced by things other than new information about costs and
benets of the TDA. This, combined with the fact that the eect of the information fair
itself was modest in absolute terms (the upper bound of the eect of the fair on the
social interaction compliers, assuming no peer eects at the TDA participation stage is
an increase of 14.8 percentage points in the participation rate after 11 months) suggests
that an individual's decision to participate in the TDA is not taken as the outcome of a
sophisticated decision process of information gathering and careful considerations of the
alternatives. This is consistent with a growing body of evidence on retirement savings
behavior, showing that individuals believe that their savings rate is too low (Choi et al.
(2001a)), but that their project to increase it are rarely followed by action (Choi et al.
(2001a), Madrian and Shea (2002)), and that retirement decision are characterized by
very strong inertia and adherence to default rules (Madrian and Shea (2001), Choi et
al. (2001b)). Thaler and Bertazi (2001) show that savings rates increase dramatically
when individuals are oered to enroll in a program in which they commit now to save
a portion of their future increase in earnings. We now directly examine the relationship
between information and decision-making in our experiment, by examining responses to
a follow-up questionnaire we sent to a sample of employees. We nd results consistent
with the above-mentioned literature.
305.2 Follow up questionnaires
A follow up questionnaire sent to 917 employees after the fair included two questions
designed to measure the employees' knowledge of the retirement benets system in the
university, as well as questions to elicit alternative retirement savings options available to
employees and to measure the extent of procrastination.
Analysis of survey data presents an additional challenge, as the response rate to our
questionnaire was less than 50%.31 Clearly, people who respond form a selected group:
for example, people who respond to the questionnaires are 8 percentage points more likely
to enroll in the TDA after 6 months than those who received it but did not return the
survey (the standard error is 0.017). As we have shown in section 4.2, the questionnaire
itself had no causal eect on participation: thus this dierence is entirely due to selection.
Moreover, those who received the questionnaire and did not respond are less likely to enroll
in the TDA after 6 months than those who did not get the questionnaire.32 In addition,
the selection seems dierent in treated versus control departments. The response rate in
treated departments is 45% (Table 1, panel D), while it is only 35% in control departments.
It may thus not be very informative to compare the responses across samples. On the other
hand, network eects within departments seem to have played an important role here too:
the response rates among treated and untreated individuals within treated departments
are essentially identical. A plausible explanation is that those who had received the fair
invitation letter were able to tell their colleagues that we had delivered on our promise
of sending the reward. Since the response rates are the same, the assumption that the
selection process is the same is reasonable. Thus, we can compare the response among
treated and untreated individuals within treated department. These responses are not
representative of the population in general, but representative of the segment of the
31This is a common problem: the survey on savings intention by Choi et al. (2001a) had a response
rate of 33%
32Since we have shown above that the questionnaire had no causal eect on enrollment, this is a sign
of selection.
31population that tends to respond to this type of questionnaires.
The results are presented in Table 7. People who answered the questionnaire are more
likely to have attended the fair than people who did not: in the treated group, 43% of the
respondents to the questionnaire attended (while 28% of the entire treated population at-
tended), and in the control group, 29% of the respondents attended (compared to 15.1%).
The dierence in attendance (14%) is similar to the dierence in fair attendance between
the two groups as a whole (13.1%), which we had recorded at the fair.33 Respondents re-
port very high satisfaction rates with the fair. Yet, the satisfaction is signicantly higher
for the control group than for the treatment group (95% against 85%). This dierence is
almost as large as the dierence in fair attendance in this sample: it suggests either that
the marginal fair participant induced by our reward was less likely to nd the fair useful
(thus supporting the hypothesis of dierential treatment eects), or that having received
the letter reduces fair satisfaction (supporting the motivational reward eect hypothesis).
In panel B, we report the response to the question \why are you not enrolled in
the TDA?", for those who report that they are not enrolled (none of them are actually
enrolled). They could check as many answers as were applicable. Individuals in the
treatment group are less likely to report that they lack information (20% versus 30%).
The dierence is signicant at the 10% level. They are more likely to say that they
want to enroll soon, but have not found the time yet (45% versus 36%), although the
t-statistic is just 1.3.34 All the other reasons for not contributing are mentioned equally
often in both groups. The reason \plan to enroll soon" is the single most often cited
reason for not contributing in both groups. In panel C, we match this answer with
33This similarity suggests that there was no systematic bias in the way we recorded departments at
the fair{even though we recorded them for only 75% of the participants.
34The dierence is 9%, almost as large as the dierence in fair participation: a simple IV on the
probability to report that one want to enrol on whether an individual went to the fair, using the letter
as instrument, would thus give a coecient very close to 1, which is also what Madrian and Shea (2002)
obtain: virtually all seminar attendee who were not yet enrolled in the plan were intending to enroll soon
after the seminar.
32their future behavior. Actual behavior is correlated with intention (virtually nobody
who did not declare that they intended to enroll did so) but falls well short of intention.
Among untreated individuals, 16.7% of those who planned to enroll do so. Among treated
individuals, 10% do so.35 Thus, letter individuals are more likely to have good intentions,
but are also more likely to procrastinate.
Panel D shows the answer to the question \where do you obtain information about
the TDA?" Not surprisingly, those in the treatment group are more likely to say that
they obtain it from the fair (and the dierence, 11%, is close to the 14% dierence in fair
attendance). However, they are less likely to obtain information from the benets fair
information packet (77% versus 93%). Those two sources of information thus appear to
be substitutes. The other sources of information seem to be used equally by both groups.
Panel E reports answers to the knowledge questions. The rst question is whether the
employee is or is not enrolled in the TDA (when we sent the letter, none of them were).
Second, we asked them whether they know the number of vendors with whom their
Dened Contribution (DC) benets are invested. Employees are automatically enrolled
in the DC plan and can choose to invest their contributions with four dierent vendors.
Many employees have more than one vendor. If they do not make a choice, the benets
oce randomly allocates them to one vendor.
Treatment and control groups are about as likely to know the number of vendors with
whom they are contributing: 74% and 71%, respectively, ventured to answer the question,
and, in total 60% of each group gave the right answer.36 However, those who received
the letter are signicantly less likely to report knowing their TDA status (94% versus
99%), and less likely to give the correct answer (89% versus 94%).37 This could re
ect
35This is in the ballpark of other studies. Following the survey conducted by Choi et al. (2001a), 14%
of those who intended to enroll in the TDA did. Following the nancial education session in Madrian
and Shea (2002), 14% of the attendees (who all intended to enroll) did.
36Those who did not answer are counted as having given the wrong answer.
37Incidentally, this level of misclassication underscores the importance of working with administrative
data when studying TDA savings behavior.
33some over-condence on their part, since this letter was sent only to those who were not
contributing. This lends some support to the motivational reward hypothesis: in this
group where the fair attendance was high, the treated group has less knowledge than the
group that was not directly treated.
In summary, participation in the fair did not seem to have a large impact on the
information set of those who received the letter: they seem to have substituted fair at-
tendance for individual research. In fact, they are more likely to be unsure about their
actual TDA status, and to wrongly report themselves as contributing even though they
are not. However, they are less likely to think they they suer from a lack of information,
and more likely to plan to enroll soon. Of course, it does not imply that the fair did not
have an impact on the information set of those who went to the fair without the letter
(used here as the control group).
6 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to identify the causal eects of information and social inter-
action on employee decisions to enroll in an employer sponsored Tax Deferred Account
retirement plan.
Our encouragement strategy successfully induced treated employees to attend a ben-
ets fair. The experimental design allowed us to demonstrate that peer eects are an
important factor in determining whether employees attend the fair. In the second stage
of the study, we presented evidence that individuals aected by the experiment are indeed
more likely to enroll in the TDA after the fair. Interestingly, we nd that the direct causal
eect of fair attendance on an attendee among those whom we directly induced to attend
the fair by means of a nancial reward seems to be very small compared to the eect of
being in a department with high fair participation. We proposed three dierent inter-
pretations, dierential treatment eects, social network eects, and motivational reward
eects, to account for these ndings. Our experiment does not allow us to distinguish
34unambiguously among these interpretations, thus illustrating how the analysis of a simple
experiment in a social and economic context may be substantially more complicated than
expected.
We are, nevertheless, able to provide an upper bound to the eect of the benets
fair on enrollment: attending the fair increases TDA participation 11 months later by a
maximum of 15% (in a sample of people who were initially not enrolled). Average TDA
participation after 11 months is only 7.5% in the control group (of which 5% attended
the fair). Mandatory fair participation might thus produce a non-negligible increase in
the enrollment 
ow, comparable to the eect of introducing a 25% employer matching
contribution (Choi et al. 2001a). However, it remains small compared to changing default
enrollment rules (Madrian and Shea (2001)) or oering delayed enrollment, as in the
enrollment the \Save More Tomorrow" program (Thaler and Bernatzi, 2001).
This paper also provides experimental evidence that social interactions are a powerful
mechanism in the process of information acquisition (i.e., the decision to seek additional
information). Individuals do not instantly learn about economic opportunities, and their
informational environment has a strong eect on their economic decisions. Low household
savings levels in the United States have concerned academics and policy makers. Rec-
ognizing that savings decisions are in
uenced by peers' savings decisions could improve
our understanding of why individuals enroll in TDAs, and may provide a rationale for
organizing 401(k)s through the workplace. The large eect of a small reward on fair at-
tendance, amplied by social eects, also suggests that individuals do not optimally seek
out and process information on their own. While the motivational reward eect must be
addressed, encouraging employees to attend benets fairs may be a useful complement to
automatic enrollment.
Finally, this study has shown that it is relatively simple and inexpensive to carry
out an experiment within a large rm to study important economic research questions.
Moreover, organizational divisions within a rm provide an excellent structure in which
to study the eects of social interaction in the workplace. We hope that our study will
35encourage this research process and induce more economists to tackle questions in labor
economics using experiments. In particular, our analysis raised more questions than we
were able to answer. Using results from this experiment as a rst step, one could think of
several alternative experimental designs that could precisely identify the eects we have
described.
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40Untreated
All Treated Untreated Departments
(group T) (group T1) (group T0) (group 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
TDA participation 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.012
before the fair (Sept. 2000) (.0015) (.0021) (.0022) (.0024)
Number of observations 4168 2039 2129 2043
Sex (% male) 0.398 0.400 0.396 0.418
(.0076) (.0109) (.0107) (.011)
Years of Service 5.898 5.864 5.930 6.008
(.114) (.161) (.16) (.157)
Salary 38547 38807 38297 38213
(304) (438) (422) (416)
Age 38.3 38.4 38.2 38.7
(.17) (.24) (.24) (.24)
Number of observations 4126 2020 2106 2018
PANEL B: FAIR ATTENDANCE (REGISTRATION DATA)
Fair attendance 0.214 0.280 0.151 0.049
among non-TDA enrollees (.0064) (.01) (.0078) (.0048)
Number of observations 4126 2020 2106 2018
Fair attendance 0.192 0.063
for all staff employes (.0132) (.0103)
Number of observations 6687 3311
PANEL C: TDA PARTICIPATION (ADMINISTRATIVE DATA)
TDA participation after 0.049 0.045 0.053 0.040
4.5 months (.0035) (.0049) (.0051) (.0045)
Number of observations 3726 1832 1894 1861
TDA participation after 0.088 0.089 0.088 0.075
11 months (.005) (.0071) (.007) (.0065)
Number of observations 3246 1608 1638 1633
PANEL D: RESPONSE RATE TO THE ADDITIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Response rate 0.452 0.440 0.464 0.352
(.018) (.0201) (.0405) (.0402)
Number of observations 765 612 153 142
Notes: 
1-Standard errors in parentheses. 
2-The first part of Panel B includes all individuals not enrolled in the TDA by
September 2000. The second part includes all employes (enrolled or not in the TDA) 
3-The average fair participation in the non-treated department was obtained from the registration information 
collected at the fair. Since only 75% of the participants 
registered, the participation was adjusted by a proportionality factor.
4-Demographic information and TDA participation are all obtained from administrative data
Treated departments
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, by groupsTreated depts. Treated vs Untreated Untreated in treated depts. Treated
vs untreated depts. in treated depts. vs untreated depts. vs untreated depts.
XT-X0 XT1-XT0 XT0-X0 XT1-X0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A- BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
Sex (% male) -0.023 0.003 -0.027 -0.017
(.024) (.015) (.022) (.025)
Years of Service -0.169 -0.061 -0.089 -0.205
(.386) (.252) (.384) (.362)
Salary 524 369 208 760
(964) (561) (847) (1002)
Age -0.56 0.16 -0.52 -0.48
(.53) (.33) (.52) (.49)
Number of observations 6144 4126 4124 4038
PANEL B: FAIR ATTENDANCE
Fair attendance  0.158 0.138 0.090 0.231
(.021) (.019) (.02) (.022)
Number of observations 6144 4126 4124 4038
PANEL C: TDA PARTICIPATION
TDA participation after 0.0097 -0.0068 0.0126 0.0075
4.5 months (.0043) (.0063) (.0053) (.0048)
Number of observations 5587 3726 3755 3693
TDA participation after 0.0141 0.0023 0.0133 0.0153
11 months (.0063) (.0103) (.0082) (.007)
Number of observations 4879 3246 3271 3241
PANEL D: RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
response rate to the questionnaire 0.1516 0.0070 0.1655 0.1465
(.0366) (.0519) (.0521) (.0376)
Number of observations 907 765 295 754
Notes:
1-Regression adjusted differences in means: departments were matched according to size and participation, 
and triplets of departments of similar contribution rate and size were formed. 
The regressions control for the triplet to which the department belongs.
2-Standard errors (reported in parentheses below the coefficient) are corrected for clustering at the department level
3-The average attendance or participation in the non-treated department was obtained from the registration information 
collected at the fair. Since only 75% of the participants 
registered, the participation was adjusted by a proportionality factor.
4-Demographic information and TDA participation are all obtained from administrative data
5-The sample is restricted to individuals who were not enrolled in the TDA before the fair. 
Table 2: Differences in background characteristics, fair attendance and TDA participation, by treatment statusOLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy for received letter 0.138 0.132 0.133
(.019) (.019) (.019)
Dummy for treated  0.090
department (.022)
Average number of  0.285
letters in the department (.072)
Average participation to the 0.753
fair in the department (.094)
Observations 6144 6144 6144
Notes: 
1- All regressions control for the triplet to which the department belongs
2-Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering at the department level
3-In the IV regressions, the instrument set consists of a dummy for whether the department 
is treated, a dummy for whether the  individual received the letters, and the triplet to which 
the department belongs.
Attended the fair
Table 3: Individual and social effects on fair attendanceT depts. Letter vs non-letter Non-letter in T depts. Letter indiv.
vs 0 depts. in T depts. vs 0 depts. vs 0 depts.
(yT-y0)/(fT-f0) (yT1-yT0)/(fT1-fT0) (yT0-y0)/(fT0-f0) (yT1-y0)/(fT1-f0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TDA participation after 0.0568 -0.0446 0.1348 0.0300
4.5 months (.0257) (.0402) (.0625) (.0195)
Number of observations 5587 3726 3755 3693
TDA participation after 0.0817 0.0142 0.1488 0.0599
11 months (.0399) (.0641) (.102) (.029)
Number of observations 4879 3246 3271 3241
Sample T1, T0, 0 T1,T0 T0,0 T1,0
Instruments Treated department Received letter Treated department Received letter
Notes: 
1- Dependent variables are individual enrollment in the TDA 4.5 months and 11months after the fair
2- Independent variable is individual fair attendance
3- All regressions control for the triplet of the department
4- Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the department level
Table 4: IV regressions: Effect of fair attendance on TDA participationFair attendance in T1 TDA participation TDA participation
(letter recipients) after 4.5 months after 11 months
(1) (2) (3)
PANEL A: DEPARMENT SIZE
Below median (81) 0.328 0.009 0.013
(.015) (.0071) (.0106)
985 2797 2403
Above median (81) 0.235 0.009 0.015
(.0132) (.0047) (.0079)
1035 2790 2476
PANEL B: DEPARTMENT AVERAGE PARTICIPATION IN THE TDA BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT
Below median (34%) 0.259 0.006 0.013
(.0134) (.0059) (.009)
1062 2929 2523




Women 0.320 0.012 0.014
(.0134) (.0071) (.0112)
1213 3298 2843




Below Median ($34021) 0.269 0.001 0.015
(.0141) (.006) (.0088)
983 2745 2291
Above Median ($34021) 0.291 0.018 0.015
(.0141) (.0065) (.0104)
1037 2842 2588
1-The sample in column 1 is composed of individuals in group T1
2-Columns 2 and 3: Regression adjusted differences in means: department were matched according to size 
and participation, and triplets of departments of similar contribution rate and size were formed. 
The regressions control for the triplet to which the department belongs.
3-Standard errors (reported in paretheses below the coefficient) corrected for clustering at the department level
Difference Group T-Group   0
Table 5: Fair attendance and treatment effect in different groupsIV OLS IV "Naïve" IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Participation after 4.5 months
Fair attendance -0.045 0.016 0.057 0.001
(.04) (.011) (.026) (.026)
3726 1832 5587 5587
B. Participation after 11 months
Fair attendance 0.014 0.052 0.082 0.042
(.064) (.018) (.04) (.039)
3246 1608 4879 4879
Sample Treated  individuals who Complete Complete
departments received the letter sample sample
Instrument Received letter NONE Treated department Received letter
Notes: 
1- Dependent variables are individual enrollment in the TDA 4.5 months and 11 months after the fair
2- Independent variable is individual fair attendance
3- All regressions control for the triplet of the department
4- Standard errors (in parentheses) are  corrected for clustering at the department level
5- The sample in column (1) is  limited to individuals (not enrolled in the TDA by Sept. 2000) in Treated 
departments. The sample in  column (2) is limited to individuals who received the letter (not enrolled in the 
TDA by Sept. 2000). The sample in column (3) and (4) is limited to individuals not enrolled in the TDA 
by Sept. 2000. 
Individual effect Overall effect
Table 6: Comparison with naive estimates: effect of the fair on TDA enrollmentTreament Control Difference
(Received invitation)
(1) (2) (3)
A. Fair participation and impressions
Fair participation 0.425 0.286 0.140
(.029) (.054) (.064)
Number of observations 301 70 371
Fair satisfaction (for those who  0.849 0.950 -0.101
attended the fair (.027) (.05) (.047)
B. Response to the question "Why are you currently not enrolled in the TDA?"
Not enough information 0.200 0.306 -0.107
(.025) (.059) (.063)
Cannot afford to save for retirement 0.328 0.371 -0.043
(.029) (.062) (.075)
Plan to enroll soon but no time to do it yet 0.446 0.355 0.091
(.031) (.061) (.07)
Other ways to save for retirement 0.220 0.242 -0.022
(.026) (.055) (.063)
255 62 317
C. Enrollment 6 months after the questionnaires
Individuals who report that  0.099 0.167 -0.067
they plan to enroll soon (.029) (.09) (.096)
Individuals who did not report that  0.020 0.000 0.020
they plan to enroll (.013) (.01)
D. Response to the question "where do you obtain information about benefits?" 
Benefits fair 0.370 0.254 0.117
(.028) (.052) (.054)
Benefits information packet 0.771 0.930 -0.158
(.024) (.031) (.039)
Personal visit to the BO 0.123 0.085 0.038
(.019) (.033) (.05)
Other information seminar 0.204 0.211 -0.007
(.023) (.049) (.049)
Colleagues 0.252 0.310 -0.058
(.025) (.055) (.053)
Family or friends 0.265 0.239 0.026
(.026) (.051) (.051)
Administrative officer 0.049 0.014 0.035
(.012) (.014) (.025)
300 71 371
E. Knowledge about benefits
Reported that she knew her TDA status 0.938 0.986 -0.048
(.014) (.014) (.022)
Reported that she knew the  0.738 0.714 0.024
number of vendors with which she  (.029) (.061) (.058)
Gave the correct answer about TDA status 0.887 0.944 -0.056
(.018) (.028) (.033)




1-All statistics are weighted by population weight
2-Standard errors of the difference corrected for clustering at the department level
3-Sample is restricted to treated deparments



















You have just received your Open Enrollment packet from the Benefits Services Group, inviting you to the 
Benefits Fair 2001.  
 
The Fair will be held in two locations:  
 








This year, as part of a study (conducted jointly by the Benefits Services Group and economics researchers) 
to better understand the impact of the Fair on benefits choices, we are offering a reward of $20 to 2,000 
employees, just for attending the Fair.  Funding for these rewards was contributed from a research grant.  
We selected those employees by a simple lottery, and your name was among those drawn. 
 
In order to receive this $20 reward, all you have to do is to come to the Fair with this letter, and give your 
name at the registration table that will be located in the main hall.  You will receive a check within the two 
weeks following the Fair. 
 
We hope that you will find the Fair helpful in making your benefits choices. However, we want to 
emphasize that the reward is completely independent of your benefits decisions. 
 





Name of the Benefits Office 
















We are currently studying whether benefits fairs, along with other way of obtaining 
information, convey the necessary information to members of the university community.  
 
In the context of our study, we would like to ask you a few questions about your 
experience in obtaining information on the university retirement plans. If you could take 
a few minutes to complete the questionnaire attached to this letter, your response would 
be greatly appreciated. Your responses will be strictly confidential and will not be used 
for any purpose other than the study. You may mail your responses in the envelope 
provided.  
 
As a token of our appreciation, we will send you a $10 Macy’s gift certificate when 











   1
First name, Last name 
 
Please answer the following 6 simple questions. You can check the “don’t know” answer 
if you are not sure of an answer.  Your answers will remain strictly confidential and will 
be used for no purpose other than this study. 
 
(1) In addition to your Basic Retirement Account, the university makes a monthly 
contribution of 3.5% of your monthly salary to an Individual Investment Account(s). You 
decide how this contribution should be invested from a list of four investment companies. 
 








(2) The university offers a supplemental retirement plan called the Tax-Deferred Account 
(TDA) program. Through the TDA program, you can add to your retirement savings by 
contributing a portion of your salary on a pre-tax basis. You pay no taxes on these 
savings or the investment income until you withdraw your funds. You decide how much 
to contribute and the university deducts your contributions from your paycheck. You 
choose how to invest your savings from a wide range of funds offered by four different 
vendors  
You are not automatically enrolled in the TDA program. 
 
Are you currently enrolled in the Tax-Deferred Account  (TDA)? 





(3) [To be filled out only if you are not currently enrolled in the TDA]  
      Why are you currently not enrolled in the TDA (check all answers that apply)? 
 
-You do not have enough information on the TDA: …… 
-Right now, you cannot afford to save for your retirement: …….. 
-You plan to enroll soon, but did not have the occasion to do it yet: …… 




(NEXT PAGE, PLEASE) 
 
   2
 
First name, last name. 
 
(3b) If you check the last answer, which other means are you using to save for 
retirement:  
    -TDA through spouse’s employer:  …….. 
    -Individual Retirement Account (IRA): …… 
-Employer provided pension plan (own): …… 
    -Employer provided pension plan (spouse): …… 
    -Other mutual funds: ……. 




(4) [To be filled out by everybody] 
From which of the following sources do you get information about the retirement plans 
(check all that apply)?  
 
-The benefits information fair: ……. 
-Benefits information packet: ………… 
-You came in person to the Benefits office: ……. 
-You attended an information seminar: …….. 
-Colleagues:……. 
-Family or friends:……… 
-The Administrative Officer of your department: …….. 
-None…… 
 









   